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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This action is an appeal from a decision rendered by the 
Seventh Judicial District Court on a Petition For Review of a 
Final Determination made by the Director of the Utah Department 
of Health on a Medicaid application. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF REPLY ISSUES 
1. Whether the federal statute which bars the 
inclusion of income from any relative, except 
that of a parent or spouse, in the calculation 
of a child applicant's eligibility for medi-
caid benefits is clear, imequivocal, and un-
ambiguous on its face and is therefore not 
subject to judicial construction. 
2. Whether the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. 
§1396a(a) (17) (D) fails to support the Execu-
tive Director's contention that the statute 
allows the unrestricted inclusion of income 
within a nuclear family in the determination 
of medicaid eligibility. 
3. Whether the legislative history of the De-
ficit Reduction Act of 1984 shows that it was 
intended to revise only AFDC eligibility 
standards and not Medicaid eligibility rules. 
4. Whether the interpretive authority of the 
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services 
is not absolute and may not be use to construe 
any statute so as to circumvent a prohibition 
clearly stated by Congress, nor construe it 
in a way which violates the Secretary's own 
regulations. 
5. Whether unamended federal law continues to 
bar deeming of Social Security Old Age 
Disability and Survivors benefits, paid 
through a representative paysf in a manner 
which would attribute them as being avail-
able to a medicaid applicant who is not 
the actual beneficiary of those benefits. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a) (17(D): 
A State plan for medical assistance must... 
include reasonable standards (which shall be 
comparable for all groups and may, in ac-
cordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, differ with respect to income 
levels, but only in the case of applicants 
or recipients of assistance under the plan 
who are not receiving aid or assistance 
under any plan of the State approved under 
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title 
IV, [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 
1351 et seq., 1381 et seq.], based on the 
variations between shelter costs in urban 
areas and in rural areas) for determining 
eligibility for and the extent of medical 
assistance under the plan which... do not 
take into account the financial responsi-
bility of any individual for any applicant 
or recipient of assistance under the plan 
unless such applicant or recipient is such 
individual's spouse or such individual's 
child who is under 21 or (with respect to 
States eligibile to participate in the 
State program established under title XVI 
[42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is 
blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 
[42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States 
which are not eligible to participate in 
such program); and provide for flexibility 
in the application of such standards with 
respect to income by taking into account, 
except to the extent prescribed by the 
Secretary, the costs (whether in the form 
of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred 
for medical care or for any other type of 
remedial care recognized under State law;... 
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(B): 
A State plan for medical assistance must... 
include reasonable standards (which shall be 
comparable for all groups and may, in ac-
cordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, differ with respect to income 
levels, but only in the case of applicants 
or recipients of assistance under the plan 
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who are not receiving aid or assistance 
under any plan of the State approved under 
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title 
IV, [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 
1351 et seq., 1381 et seq.], based on the 
variations between shelter costs in urban 
areas and in rural areas) for determining 
eligibility for and the extent of medical 
assistance under the plan which... provide 
for taking into account only such income 
and resources as are, as determined in ac-
cordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, available to the applicant or 
recipient and (in the case of any applicant 
or recipient who would, except for income 
and resources, be eligible for aid or 
assistance in the form of money payments 
under any plan of the State approved under 
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of 
title IV [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et 
seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et 
seq.,], or to have paid with respect to 
him supplemental security income benefits 
under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]) 
as would not be disregarded (or set aside 
for future needs) in determining his eli-
bility for such aid, assistance, or bene-
r in S ,.... 
42 U.S.C. §602(a)(38): 
A State plan for aid and service to needy 
families with children must- ... 
(38) provide that in making the determination 
under paragraph (7) with respect to a depen-
dent child and applying paragraph (8), the 
State agency shall (except as otherwise pro-
vided in this part [42 USCS §§601 et seq.]) 
include-
(A) any parent of such child, and 
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if 
such brother or sister meets the conditions 
described in clauses (1) and (20 of section 
406(a) [42 USCS §606(a)], if such parent, 
brother, or sister is living in the same 
home as the dependent child, and any incomo 
of or available for such parent, brother, or 
sister shall be included in making such deter-
mination and applying such paragraph with 
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respect to the family (notwithstanding sec-
tion 205(j) [42 USCS §405 (j)]f in the case 
of benefits provided under title II [42 USCS 
§§401 et seq.]); and 
42 C.F.R. §435.113: 
The agency must provide Medicaid to indi-
viduals who would be eligible for AFDC 
except for an eligibility requirement used 
in that program that is specifically pro-
hibited under title XIX. 
42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2): 
(1) When it appears to the Secretary that the in-
terest of an applicant entitled to a payment would 
be served thereby, certification of payment may be 
made, regardless of the legal competency or incom-
petency of the individual entitled thereto, either 
for direct payment to such applicant, or for his use 
and benefit to a relative or some other person. 
(2) Any certification made under paragraph (1) for 
payment to a person other than the individual en-
titled to such payment must be made on the basis of 
an investigation, carried out either prior to such 
certification or within forty-five days after such 
certification, and on the basis of adequate evidence 
that such certification is in the interest of the 
individual entitled to such payment (as determined 
by the Secretary in regulations). The Secretary 
shall insure that such certification are adequately 
reviewed. 
42 U.S.C. §408(e): 
Whoever... (e) having made application to receive 
payment under this title for the use and benefit of 
another and having received such a payment, 
knowingly and willfully converts such a payment, 
or any party thereof, to a use other than for 
the use and benefit of such other person; ... 
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction 
thereof shall be fined not more than $5000 or im-
prisoned for not more than five years, or both. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the Appellee1s Response Brief, the Executive Director 
of the Department of Health argues that the legislative histories 
of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(17) (D) and the Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984 (P.L 98-369, §2640f "DEFRA" below) indicate that Congress 
intended to permit the deeming of income from persons other than 
spouses or parents in determining Medicaid eligibility, despite 
the contrary language of subsection (17)(D). However, this argu-
ment ignores the well-established rule that when a federal 
statute is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal on its face, courts 
are barred from engaging in judicial construction of the statute 
and will not examine its legislative history to ascertain its 
meaning. Subsection (17)(D) presents such an unambiguous 
statute, for it clearly prohibits the deeming of income from any 
individual but a spouse or parent. The judicial construction 
urged by the Executive Director is therefore inappropriate and 
section 1396a(a)(17)(D) must be enforced according to its plain 
terms. If this enforcement is made, the Executive Directorfs 
Final Determination, which deemed sibling income as available to 
Jerry Grandson, is rendered invalid. 
The legislative history of section 1396a (a) (17) (D) does 
not, in any event, support the Executive Directorfs contention 
that all "nuclear family" income may be deemed as available to an 
applicant for Medicaid. All courts which have examined the 
legislative history of the section have concluded that Congress 
simply had no intention to allow the inclusion of income fiom any 
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individual other than a spouse or parent. The legislative his-
tory is entirely consistent with the plain prohibition of section 
1396a(a)(17)(D). 
The legislative history of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984 does not support the argument that it somehow amended 
Medicaid eligibility rules. Once againf all courts which have 
analyzed the legislative history of DEFRA conclude that it 
modified only AFDC eligibility rules, and they refuse to find 
that DEFRA was intended to alter the express prohibition of sec-
tion 1396a(a)(17)(D) which governs Medicaid eligibility. 
The Executive Director then argues that, despite the 
prohibitions created by the plain language and legislative his-
tories of these statutes, the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services has interpreted them so as to allow the prohibited deem-
ing and this interpretation must be accorded legislative effect 
and great deference. This argument ignores the rule that the 
Secretary's interpretative pronouncements are only entitled to 
legislative effect if they do not exceed his statutory authority. 
Nor are these interpretations entitled to great deference if they 
violate the Secretary's own regulations. And, in fact, the 
courts have found that section 1396a (a) (17) (D) is a statutory 
limitation on the Secretary's interpretative authority which 
renders void, rather than giving legislative effect to, his rule 
permitting the deeming of income from individuals other than a 
spouse or parent. In the same vein, the courts have held that 
the Secretary's own regulation, 42 C.F.R. §435.113, which states 
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that Medicaid may not be denied as a consequence of an AFDC 
eligibility requirement prohibited by the Medicaid statute, also 
places a constraint on the Secretary's interpretative authority. 
In short, the Secretary's interpretation carries no weight here. 
Finally, prior to DEFRA there was a well-recognized 
rule that benefits paid through a representative payee, such as 
Aid To Families With Dependent Children or Social Security Old 
Age Disability And Survivors Insurance, could only be used for 
the actual beneficiary, and any eligibility determination which 
assumed that income to be available to another person was invalid 
as a consequence. The Executive Director argues that DEFRA 
removed this ban in regard to AFDC eligibility and, because AFDC 
and Medicaid eligibility rules are identical, the ban must also 
be lifted in regard to Medicaid benefits paid through a repre-
sentative payee. Jerry Grandson agrees that the ban may have 
been removed in AFDC cases, though the courts differ on this con-
clusion. What is clear is that, once again, DEFRA applies only 
to AFDC eligibility and, by its plain terms, removed the ban only 
in AFDC cases. In addition, AFDC and Medicaid eligibility rules 
are separate, rather than identical, so it does not necessarily 
follow that specific removal of a general prohibition, as it ap-
plies to AFDC, also works to remove that prohibition in Medicaid 
cases, or indeed, any other case involving benefits paid through 
a representative payee. 
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ARUGMENT 
I. THE FEDERAL STATUTE WHICH BARS THE INCLUSION 
OF INCOME FROM ANY RELATIVE, EXCEPT THAT OF A 
PARENT OR SPOUSE, IN THE CALCULATION OF A CHILD 
APPLICANT'S ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS 
IS CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL, AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS 
FACE AND IS THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL 
CONSTRUCTION. 
In Points I, II, and III of the Respondent's Brief, the 
Executive Director of the Department of Health argues that this 
case may only be resolved through statutory construction of 42 
U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(D) (which bars the State from taking into 
account the financial responsibility of any individual for 
another individual, other than a spouse or parent of a minor 
child, in Medicaid eligibility determinations) and section 2640 
of the Deficit Reduction Act (which permits such deeming of in-
come in determining eligibility for the Aid To Families With De-
pendent Children program). The Executive Director specifically 
argues that the legislative history of section 17(D) indicates 
that it was intended to remove the burden of financial respon-
sibility of adult children for elderly parents, that Congress in-
tended minor children to be included in a nuclear family filing 
unit thus permitting the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to deem the income of minor children to be available to that 
filing unit and, finally, that Congress was aware that DEFRA 
would change Medicaid eligibility and desired this result so as 
to re-allocate scarce public resources. 
The Executive Director leaps into this statutory con-
struction without first examining whether such interpretation is 
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warranted by the canons of construction. Howeverr under one of 
the primary canons, such construction is rendered inappropriate 
in the present case. 
It is a well-established rule that when a federal 
statute is clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal on its face, the 
courts are barred from engaging in judicial construction of the 
statute and will not examine its legislative history to ascertain 
its meaning. Rubin v. United States (1981) 449 U.S. 424, 430; 
T.V.A. v. Hill (1978) 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29; Ex Parte Collette 
(1949) 337 U.S.55, 61; Miles v. Wells (1900) 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 
534, 536; see. Board of Education v. Granite School District v. 
Salt Lake County (1983) Utah, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035. The United 
States Supreme Court has given a rationale for this rule. In 
Gemsco Inc. v. Walling (1945) 324 U.S. 244, the Court observed 
[t]he plain words and meaning of a statute 
cannot be overcome by a legislative history 
which, through strained processes of deduc-
tion from events of wholly ambiguous signi-
ficance, may furnish dubious bases for in-
ference in every direction. 
I£., at p.260. 
This rule of construction supplies the short answer to 
the Executive Director's arguments regarding statutory intent. 
Section 1396a(a)(17)(D) plainly, clearly, and unambiguously 
states that 
[a] State plan for medical assistance must ... 
include reasonable standards ... for determin-
ing eligibility ... which ... do not take into 
account the financial responsibility of any 
individual for any applicant or recipient of 
12 
assistance ... unless such applicant or recipient 
is such individual's spouse or such individuals 
child who is under 21....(Emphasis supplied) 
The statute only permits deeming of income from spouses or the 
parents of minor children. By its clear terms it bars the deem-
ing of income from grandparents, siblings, or any other rela-
tives. Any argument which attempts to broaden the scope of the 
statute by permitting the accounting of the financial respon-
sibility of individuals other than a spouse or parent must neces-
sarily ignore the plain language of section 17(D). Any argument 
which attempts to circumvent this plain language, through judi-
cial construction of the statute based upon legislative history, 
also necessarily ignores the canon of construction barring such 
interpretation. Such a result is impermissable. 
The Courts which have already considered this issue 
uniformly agree that section 17(D) is plain and unambiguous. In 
Vance v. Hegstrom (9th Cir. 1986) 793 F.2d 1018, the Court noted 
that 
...the plain language of subsection (17)(D) 
explicitly prohibits the deeming of income 
from persons other than a Medicaid applicant's 
spouse, or a parent in the case of a child 
who is under twenty-one, blind or permanently 
and totally disabled. There is no clearly 
expressed legislative intent to the contrary. 
Id. at p. 1024. Other courts have reached similar holdings which 
find that the unequivocal language of section 17(D) absolutely 
bars the deeming of income from persons other than a spouse or 
parent of a minor child. Reed v. Blinzinger (S.D. Ind. 1986) 639 
13 
F. Supp. 130, 134; Olson v. Reagen (S.D. Iowa 1986) 631 F.Supp. 
154, 159 ["...both the clear language of the statute and the 
legislative history indicate that it is impermissible ... to deem 
available to the filing unit income from relatives other than a 
spouse or the parent of a minor child."]; Gibson v. Puett (M.D. 
Tenn. 1985) 630 F. Supp. 542f 544-545 [Deeming of sibling income 
in determining Medicaid eligibility is specifically prohibited by 
section 1396a(a) (17) (D);]; Malloy v. Eichler (D.Del. 1986) 628 F. 
Supp. 582, 593-594, 598 [Plain language of the Medicaid Act 
limits the Secretary's authority to deem income as available only 
from a parent or spouse, and not from a sibling.]; Sundberg v. 
Mansour (W.D. Mich. 1986) 627 F.Supp. 616, 620 ["...section 
1396a (a)(17) (D) prohibits the Secretary from requiring states to 
consider sibling income and resources in making medicaid 
eligibility determinations."]. 
Given the clarity of the prohibition contained in sec-
tion 1396a(a)(17)(D), it would be inappropriate for this Court to 
engage in a judicial construction of the statute as the Executive 
Director urges. Rather, the canons of construction require that 
the statute be enforced according to its plain meaning. If such 
enforcement is made then the Executive Director's Final Deter-
mination, and Judge Bunnell's decision in upholding that deci-
sion, must be held to have violated the unambiguous dictate of 
the statute. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1396a 
(a)(17)(D) DOES NOT SUPPORT THE EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR'S CONTENTION THAT IT ALLOWS THE 
14 
UNRESTRICTED INCLUSION OF INCOME WITHIN A 
NUCLEAR FAMILY. 
In Point I of her Brief, the Executive Director argues 
that the legislative history of section 1396a(a)(17)(D) indicates 
that Congress only enacted the statute to prevent adult children 
from being saddled with financial responsibility for their 
elderly parents. The Executive Director concludes thatf whatever 
the language of the statute, Congress intended that the income of 
minor children would be counted in eligibility determinations. 
However, the Executive Director does admit that "... there is no 
indication that Congress has ever considered the income of minor 
children.11 Respondent's Brief at p.11. 
The legislative history of section 1396a(a) (17)(D) 
simply does not support the Executive Director's position. The 
courts have focused upon the Congressional intent indicated by 
the following report extract: 
The committee has heard of hardships on 
certain individuals by requiring them to 
provide support and to pay for the medical 
care needed by relatives. The committee 
believes it is proper to expect spouses 
to support each other and parents to be 
held accountable for the support of their 
minor children and their blind or perma-
nently and totally disabled children even 
though 21 years of age or older. Such re-
requirements for support may reasonably 
include the payment by such relative, if 
able, for medical care. Beyond such de-
gree of relationship, however, requirements 
imposed are often destructive and harmful 
to the relationship among members of the 
family group. Thus, States may not in-
clude in their plans provisions for re-
guifing contributions frorn^xelatives 
other than 3 spouse oc the parent of a 
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minor child or children over 21 who are 
blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
S.Rep. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (Finance Committee) (June 
30, 1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1943 1943, 
2018; H.Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (Ways and Means 
Committee) (March 29, 1965) [emphasis added]. 
In Malloy v. Eichler(supra) 628 F.Supp. at pp. 594-595, 
the federal District Court stated that this provision showed a 
...desire to prevent family discord [which] 
cannot be limited to cases where an adult 
child must support a geriatric parent. The 
Secretary's argument that such a shackle 
should be placed on Congressional symphathy 
is not supported by the legislative history 
which makes it clear "beyond doubt that Con-
gress was wary of imputing the income of 
others to a Medicaid applicant." Schweiker 
v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 47, 101 S.Ct. 
at 2642 (emphasis added). Only the income of 
spouses and parents was thought to be a reason-
able exception to the actual availability 
principle. 
Accord, Vance v. Hegstrom (supra) 793 F.2d at p.1024 ["The legis-
lative history refers only to a spouse, or the parent of a minor 
child, or the parent of children over twenty-one who are blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, and does not include the term 
"nuclear family".]; Sundberg v. Mansour (supra) 627 F.Supp. at 
pp. 620-621 ["As the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress thus 
decided to treat spouses (and parents) differently than other 
relatives in determining the financial eligibility of Medicaid 
applicants and recipient* [citation] [Par.] There is no indica-
tion, however, that Congress intended to include siblings...."]. 
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There is no support in the legislative history of sec-
tion 1396a(a)(17)(D) for the Executive Director's argument that 
she may include sibling income in her medicaid eligibility deter-
minations. Rather, the history underscores the plain language of 
the statute which bars such inclusions. 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEFICIT 
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 ONLY SUPPORTS A 
VIEW THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO REVISE 
AFDC ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS BUT NOT MEDI-
CAID ELIGIBILITY RULES. 
In Point III of her Brief, the Executive Director con-
tends that Congress, when it enacted DEFRA, was cognizant of the 
fact that AFDC and Medicaid eligibility determinations are linked 
together, that Congress desired to re-allocate scarce public 
resources through DEFRA, and that Congress must have intended to 
changed Medicaid eligibility simultaneously with AFDC 
eligibility. However, the courts which have examined the legis-
lative history of DEFRA have rejected this argument. 
In a very well-reasoned holding, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated, in Vance v. Hegstrom (supra) 793 F.2d at 
pp. 1024 - 1025, that 
The Secretary also contends that his defi-
nition of a Medicaid filing unit is consis-
tent with Congress's reason for passing 
DEFRA, which was to reduce spending in 
light of a huge federal deficit. [citation] 
The Secretary relies on statements made by 
members of Congress, and statements made in 
Congressional staff reports, that changes 
in the AFDC filing unit would result in 
decreases in the number of children receiv-
ing Medicaid, thus suggesting Congress 
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recognized a change in the AFDC filing unit 
view that changes in AFDC WQVtld also efr. 
feet Medicaid eligibility. They are not 
statements of what Congress intended when 
it passed DEFRA. The statute finally en-
acted by Congress which required states 
to include sibling income_when determining 
AFDC eligibility is directed solely to the 
provisions of 42 U.S.C. S 602, which is a 
component of the AFDC statute, and not to 
subsection (17)(D). We must assume that 
Congress was aware of subsection (17)(D) 
when it enacted the AFDC amendments, could 
have amended subsection (17)(D), and chose not 
to do so. [citation] (emphasis supplied.) 
Accord, Malloy v. Eichler (supra) 628 F.Supp. at pp. 596-597 
["...the legislative history is ... silent about any change in 
the purpose of subsection (17)(D) .... [Par.] [and] [t]he Court 
cannot presume that Congress intended to cut Medicaid assistance 
because it reduced the availability of AFDC."]; Olson v. Reagan 
(supra) 631 F.Supp. at p.159; Reed v. Blinzinger (supra) 639 
F.Supp at p.134 ["The evidence is insufficient to find that 
Congress intended for §2640 to modify the express provisions of 
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(D) and allow the income of a sibling to 
be assumed available to a Medicaid applicant."]. 
There is nothing contained in the legislative history 
of DEFRA which suggests that Congress intended to alter the unam-
biguous dictate of §1396a (a) (17) (D). Taken together, the legis-
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lative histories of that statute and DEFRA will only support an 
application of section 17(D) which bars the inclusion of sibling 
income in a Medicaid eligibility determination. The plain mean-
ing of section of section 17(D) is reinforced by examination of 
the legislative histories. As a consequence, the Executive 
Director's decision to circumvent the prohibition of the section 
rendered her Final Determination legally invalid. 
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS MADE BY THE U.S. 
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE OR LEGISLATIVE 
EFFECT WHERE THOSE INTERPRETATIONS VIOLATE 
CLEAR CONGRESSIONAL PROHIBITIONS AND THE 
SECRETARY'S OWN REGULATIONS. 
In Point II of her Brief, the Executive Director con-
tends that by interpreting sibling income as being income which 
is "available" (under §1396a(a)(17)(B)) to a nuclear family 
filing unit, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is making 
an administrative determination which is entitled to legislative 
effect. And in Point V, the Executive Director argues that such 
interpretations must, in addition, be accorded great deference by 
the courts. However, whatever the authority of the Secretary, it 
is certainly not absolute and cannot be used to interpret 
statutes in a manner which avoids an unequivocal Congressional 
prohibition. The Secretary may also not use this authority to 
violate his own regulations. 
The former principle is best illustrated by a case much 
cited by the Executive Director: Schweiker v. Gray Panthers 
(1981) 453 U.S. 34. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
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the Secretary's definition of the term "available" (for income 
determinations) is entitled to legislative effect. M . , at p.44. 
But this does not render the Secretary's power absoluter and the 
courts may review his definitions to determine whether they are 
made in a manner which exceeds his statutory authority. Ibid. 
The Court noted that spousal income could be deemed as 
"available" by the Secretary because such attribution was not 
barred by section 1396a(a)(17)(D). Id. at pp. 44-49. However, 
the Court emphasized that this result was possible only because 
of the clear distinction between spousal deeming and the deeming 
of other relatives1 income which Congress had drawn in section 
1396a(a) (17) (D). The tenor of the holding strongly suggests that 
if the Secretary attempted deeming of other relatives' income, 
such deeming would exceed the Secretary's statutory authority and 
his definition would not be entitled to legislative effect or 
deference from the courts. 
Andf indeed, the courts which have examined deeming of 
sibling and other relatives' income in Medicaid cases have found 
that it is done in excess of the Secretary's statutory authority 
and is therefore impermissible. Vance v. Hegstrom (supra) 793 
F.2d at p.1024 ["Although the Secretary has been granted broad 
authority under subsection (17)(B) to prescribe standards setting 
eligibility requirements for State Medicaid plans, [citation], 
the Secretary's statutory authority is not unlimited .... In 
structuring a Medicaid filing unit by defining it in such a way 
as to include sibing income, the Secretary is doing through sub-
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section (17)(B) that which he is expressly precluded from doing 
by subsection (17) (D)."]; Reed v. Blinzinger (supra) 639 F.Supp. 
at p.134 ["The Secretary's interpretation of [DEFRA] conflicts 
with the Medicaid statute, regulations, and congressional intent 
of the Medicaid Act. [ ] Therefore, the Secretary's interpreta-
tion is not controlling....11]; Olson v. Reagen (supra) 631 F. 
Supp. at 159 [The deeming sought by the Secretary is "... con-
trary to the Congressional intent to limit that responsibility to 
spouses and parents. It follows that the Secretary has exceeded 
her statutory authority . . . " ] ; Malloy v. Eichler (supra) 628 
F.Supp. at p. 598) ["... the use of section 2640 of DEFRA to 
determine Medicaid eligibility contravenes the mandate of subsec-
tion (17)(D) of Title XIX. The Secretary's views do not deserve 
legislative effect or substantial weight because they are wholly 
inconsistent with the legislative and judicial history of the 
statutes involved.]; Sundberg v. Mansour (supra) 627 F.Supp. at 
p.620. 
The Secretary is also prohibited from making a 
statutory interpretation which violates his own regulations, for 
those regulations have the force of law until properly amended or 
repealed. Vance v. Hegstrom (supra) 793 F.Supp. at p.1025; 
Flores v. Bowen (1986 9th Cir.) 790 F.2d 740, 742. By deeming 
sibling income as available in Medicaid eligibility determina-
tions, the Secretary does violate a valid regulation. 
Section 453.113, Title 42, of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, states 
21 
The agency must provide Medicaid to indi-
viduals who would be eligible for AFDC 
except for an eligibility requirement used 
in that program that is specifically pro-
hibited under title XIX. 
The significance of the regulation is apparent. AFDC eligibility 
rules which permit deeming of sibling income may not be used to 
determine Medicaid eligibility because that kind of deeming is 
specifically prohibited by section 1396a (a) (17) (D) of Title XIX. 
That regulation is binding on the Secretary and he may not cir-
cumvent it through statutory interpretation. Vance v. Hegstrom 
(supra) 793 F.2d at p. 1025. 
The Secretary's interpretations of DEFRA and subsection 
(17) (D) are not entitled to either legislative or judicial 
deference because his interpretations exceed his statutory 
authority and ignore his own validf unrepealed regulations. The 
Executive Director's reliance upon this interpretative authority 
is therefore erroneous and renders her Final Determination ar-
bitrary and capricious. 
V. UNAMENDED FEDERAL STATUTES CONTINUE TO 
BAR DEEMING OF SOCIAL SECURITY OLD AGE 
DISABILITY AND SURVIVORS BENEFITS PAID 
THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE. 
In Part II of the Appellant's Brief, Jerry Grandson 
pointed out that federal statutes and regulation required that 
Social Security benefits paid through a representative payee for 
a third person may only be applied to that third person's use, 
and that violations of this restriction constitute a federal 
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felony. 42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2); 42 U.S.C. §408(e). The 
Brief also discussed pre-DEFRA cases which held that deeming of 
such income was prohibited by these regulations in the determina-
tion of AFDC eligibility. Even after the passage of DEFRAr the 
courts are divided as to whether this bar has been lifted in AFDC 
cases. Finally, Jerry Grandson noted that, even if DEFRA had 
removed this bar in AFDC cases, DEFRA was strictly limited to 
amending AFDC eligibility rules and could not be seen as removing 
the representative payee deeming bar as it relates to any other 
benefits payments, such as Social Security Survivor's benefits. 
The Executive Director's response (in Point IV of her 
Brief) is twofold: first, she reiterates that courts have held 
the representative payee deeming bar to be lifted by DEFRA in 
AFDC eligibility determinations; second, because AFDC and 
Medicaid eligibility standards are identical, as argued elsewhere 
in her Brief, removal of the bar on such deeming in AFDC cases 
necessarily works the same result in Medicaid cases. The first 
contention misses the point of the appellant's discussion, and 
the second contention is merely wrong. 
Section 2640 of DEFRA may have removed the bar on deem-
ing representative payee income in AFDC cases. However, as was 
discussed in the Appellant's Brief and the preceeding sections of 
this Reply, the courts have been uniform in their holdings that 
DEFRA applies only to the AFDC eligibility rules of the Social 
Security Act. Thus, the fact that some, most, or even all, 
courts have found the representative payee bar lifted in AFDC 
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eligibility determinations does not effect Medicaid cases. But 
these authorities do show that there was a recognized bar which 
had to be lifted through actual Congressional action. 
The Executive Director finds the Congressional action 
by reconcilling AFDC and Medicaid eligibility requirments. The 
extent of this argument is a statement that 
[b]ecause the Medicaid agency must apply 
the financial eligibility requirements of 
the AFDC program [citation]r the removal 
of this bar logically extends to the 
Medicaid program as well. 
Appellee's Response Brief at p.22. 
The preceeding sections of this Brief have already 
demonstrated the invalidity of the premise of the Executive 
Director's statement. The AFDC and Medicaid eligibility rules 
are not identical. AFDC eligibility is governed by Title II of 
the Social Security Act, and Medicaid is controlled by section 
1396a of Title XIX. DEFRA may have amended Title IIf but it had 
no effect on Title XIX. If the linkage of eligibility rules does 
not exist, but instead we find separate sets of rules, then 
removal of a bar or prohibition applicable to one set of rules 
does not remove that bar as to the other set. The Executive 
Director's statement is fallacious and does not suggest a 
legitimate ground for abolition of the prohibition on deeming of 
representative payee OADSI benefits in Medicaid cases. 
By its terms, section 2640 of DEFRA has removed the bar 
against deeming representative payee OADSI income in AFDC cases 
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only. But there is nothing in DEFRA or its legislative history 
which suggests that Congress intended to remove this bar for any 
other kinds of benefits paid through a representative payee. Be-
cause Jerry Grandson's siblings received their Social Security 
Survivor's benefits through a representative payee, the Executive 
Director's Final Determination violated federal lav/ by deeming 
this income as being available to Jerry. 
CONCLUSION 
In her Brief, the Executive Director of the Department 
of Health argues that this case may only be resolved by examining 
the legislative histories of 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(D) and the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Such an examination is said to 
reveal Congress' intent to permit deeming of sibling income in 
determining Medicaid eligibility, despite the clear prohibition 
of section 1396a(a)(17)(D) which bars such deeming unless the in-
come is from a spouse or parent of a minor child. In addition, 
the Executive Director argues that such deeming is based upon a 
statutory interpretation by the U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, and this interpretation must be accorded great 
deference and legislative effect. Finally, the Executive Direc-
tor argues that a ban on deeming of benefit income received 
through a representative payee must be removed for Social 
Security Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance benefits if 
Congress removed it for AFDC benefits. 
In reply, Jerry Grandson has pointed out that the 
canons of statutory construction render it inappropriate for a 
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court to engage in the judicial construction of an unambiguous 
statute through examination of its legislative history. Section 
1396a(a) (17) (D) fits this rule for it clearly bans the deeming of 
income from any individual other than a spouse of parent of a 
minor child. Thus the statute is entitled to be enforced in ac-
cordance with its plain terms. 
Such enforcement would be consistent with the legisla-
tive histories of the statutes in any event. The courts have 
consistently found that Congress intended to bar all deeming of 
income from any persons other than spouses or parents in Medicaid 
eligibility determinations through the enactment of section 
1396a(a) (17) (D). The courts also find no evidence that Congress 
intended to change this rule through enactment of DEFRA, which 
they instead find was concerned solely with eligibility for AFDC 
benefits. 
Finally, there is also no evidence that the bar on 
deeming of representative payee income has been waived in any but 
AFDC cases. The statute removing that ban for AFDC eligibility 
determinations refers only to AFDC and not to any other benefit 
program. As a consequence, the bar must remain in place for 
other programs, such as Social Security Survivors benefits. 
Because there are no appropriate arguments which allow 
the deeming of sibling income in determining Medicaid 
eligibility, the Executive Director's Final Determination, which 
did allow such deeming, violated federal and state statutes and 
regulations. Her decision was therefore arbitrary and capricious 
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and deserved to be reversed. The failure of the District Court 
to take that action was an error of law. 
Date:< 3<? <kuvL/<?X? 
1%d>r-
Steven Boos 
DNA-PEOPLE'S LEGAL SERVICES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Note: House Report No. 213 is fully 
reproduced at Item No. 11 in 
the addenda of the Appellee's 
Response Brief, and is not 
reproduced again here. 
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